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Abstract. We study the complexity of finding a Walrasian equilibrium
in markets where the agents have k-demand valuations, where k is a con-
stant. This means that the maximum value of every agent comes from
a bundle of size at most k. Our results are threefold. For unit-demand
agents, where the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed, we
show that the problem is in quasi-NC. Put differently, we give the first
parallel algorithm that finds a Walrasian equilibrium in polylogarithmic
time. This comes in striking contrast to all existing algorithms that are
highly sequential. For k = 2, we show that it is NP-hard to decide if a
Walrasian equilibrium exists even if the valuations are submodular, while
for k = 3 the hardness carries over to budget-additive valuations. In ad-
dition, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for markets with 2-demand
single-minded valuations, or unit-demand valuations. Our last set of re-
sults consists of polynomial-time algorithms for k-demand valuations in
unbalanced markets; markets where the number of items is significantly
larger than the number of agents, or vice versa.
Keywords: Walrasian equilibrium · NP hardness · Parallel algorithms.
1 Introduction
One of the most significant problems in market design is finding pricing schemes
that guarantee good social welfare under equilibrium. Evidently, the most com-
pelling equilibrium notion in markets with indivisible items is a Walrasian eqilib-
rium, henceforth WE, [33]: an allocation of items to the agents and a pricing,
such that every agent maximizes her utility and all items are allocated. By the
First Welfare Theorem, WE has the nice property that maximizes social welfare.
The existence of WE seems to heavily rely on the class of valuation functions of
⋆ The work of the third author was supported by the EPSRC grant EP/P02002X/1.
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the agents. When parameterized by the valuation function class, the existence of
WE is (relatively) clear due to Gul and Stracchetti [20] and Milgrom [28]: WE
are guaranteed to exist only in the class of gross substitutes valuation functions.
Two of the most central and interesting problems regarding WE are:
(a) decide if a WE exists,
(b) compute a WE (if it exists).
We study the aforementioned two problems when valuation functions are
parameterized by an integer k which denotes the maximum bundle size k for
which every player is interested. Such a class of k-demand valuation functions
can be seen as an extension of the unit-demand functions, where each agent,
for a given bundle X values only the most valuable k-subset of X . This is a
natural class of valuation functions since in real markets it could be the case
that more than k items have the same value as k of them; one can hang only a
certain number of paintings on their house’s walls. We investigate the complexity
of the aforementioned problems when we are restricted to the intersection of
the standard valuation classes and the k-demand classes. Our results contain
hardness results as well as efficient algorithms.
As an example of the effect that k-demand valuation functions have on the
complexity of these problems, we present unbalanced markets. In such markets,
the available items are significantly more than the allocated items, or vice versa.
We provide algorithms for the aforementioned problems parameterized by k. In
particular, in these markets when k is constant these problems are in P.
1.1 Walrasian Equilibria and Valuation Functions
We consider markets with a set N of n agents and a set M of m items. Every
agent i has a valuation function vi : 2
M → R≥0; for every subset, or bundle,
of items X ⊆ M agent i has value vi(X). A valuation function vi is monotone
if X ⊆ Y implies vi(X) ≤ vi(Y ), and it is normalized if vi(∅) = 0. In what
follows, we assume that all the agents have monotone and normalized valuation
functions.
There are many different valuation functions studied over the years and we
focus on several of them.5
– Unit-demand (UD): for agent i there existm values vi1, . . . , vim and vi(X) =
maxj∈X vij , for every X ⊆M .
– Additive (AD): for agent i there exist m values vi1, . . . , vim and vi(X) =∑
j∈X vij , for every X ⊆M .
– Budget-additive (BA): for every agent i there exist m + 1 val-
ues vi1, . . . , vim, Bi, such that for every X ⊆ M it is vi(X) =
min
{
Bi,
∑
j∈X vij
}
.
5 When we refer to a valuation function as general we mean that the value for any
bundle does not depend on other bundles’ values. It is clear that the set of general
functions contains all other classes of functions.
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– Single-minded (SMi): for agent i there exist a set Xi ⊆ M and a value Bi,
and vi(X) = Bi, if Xi ⊆ X , and vi(X) = 0, otherwise.
– Submodular (SubM): for agent i and every two sets of items X and Y it
holds vi(X) + vi(Y ) ≥ vi(X ∪ Y ) + vi(X ∩ Y ).
– Fractionally subadditive (XOS): for every agent there exist vectors
vi1, . . . vik ∈ R
m and vi(X) = maxj∈[k]
∑
l∈X vik(l), for every X ⊆M .
– Subadditive (SubA): for agent i and every two sets of items X and Y it
holds vi(X) + vi(Y ) ≥ vi(X ∪ Y ).
We will focus on constrained versions of the aforementioned valuation func-
tions, where the constraint bounds the cardinality of the sets an agent has value
for.
Definition 1 (k-demand valuation). A valuation function v : 2m → R≥0 is
k-demand if for every bundle X ⊆M it holds that
v(X) = max
X′⊆X,|X′|≤k
v(X ′).
k-demand valuations naturally generalize unit-demand valuations, but, at the
same time, they keep the structure of more complex valuation functions. In
addition, when k is a constant, they have a succinct representation.
An allocation S = (S0, S1, . . . , Sn) is a partition of M to n + 1 disjoint
bundles, thus Si∩Sj = ∅, where agent i ∈ [n] gets bundle Si. Items in S0 are not
allocated to any agent. The social welfare of allocation S is defined as SW (S) =∑
i∈[n] vi(Si). An allocation S is optimal if it maximizes the social welfare, i.e.,
SW (S) ≥ SW (S′), for every possible allocation S′. A pricing p = (p1, . . . , pm)
defines a price for every item, where pj ≥ 0 is the price of item j. For X ⊆ M ,
we denote p(X) =
∑
j∈X pj . Given an allocation S and a pricing p, the utility
of agent i is
ui(S, p) := vi(Si)− p(Si).
The demand correspondence of agent i with valuation vi under pricing p,
denoted D(vi, p), is the set of items that maximize the utility of the agent;
formally D(vi, p) := {S ⊆ M : ui(S, p) ≥ ui(T, p) for all T ⊆ M}. Any element
of D(vi, p) is called demand set of agent i.
Definition 2 (Gross substitutes (GS)[23]). A valuation function satisfies
the gross substitutes property when for any price vectors p ∈ Rm and S ∈ D(v, p),
if p′ is a price vector p ≤ p′ (meaning that for all l ∈ S, pl ≤ p′l), then there is
a set S′ ∈ D(v, p′) such that S ∩ {j; pj = p′j} ⊆ S
′.
Intuitively, a valuation is gross substitute if after the increase of the prices
of some items in some demand set S of an agent the agent still has a demand
set S′ that contains the items with unchanged prices.
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It is known that UD ⊂ BA ⊂ SubM, that AD ⊂ GS ⊂ SubM, and finally
that SubM ⊂ XOS ⊂ SubA. In addition, SMi valuation functions are not
contained in any of these valuation classes.
Definition 3 (Walrasian Equilibrium). An allocation S = (S0, S1, . . . , Sn)
and a pricing p = (p1, . . . , pm) form a Walrasian equilibrium (WE), if the fol-
lowing two conditions hold.
1. For every agent i and any bundle X ⊆ M it holds that vi(Si) − p(Si) ≥
vi(X)− p(X).
2. For every item j ∈ S0 it holds that pj = 0.
Walrasian
Input: A market with n agents and m items, and a valuation function for
each agent.
Task: Decide whether the market possesses a Walrasian equilibrium, and
if it does, compute one.
The First Welfare Theorem states that for any Walrasian equilibrium (S, p),
partition S corresponds to an optimal allocation [25]. Hence, walrasian can be
decomposed into the following two problems.
WinnerDetermination
Input: A market with n agents and m items, and a valuation function for
each agent.
Task: Find an optimal allocation S∗ for the items.
WalrasianPricing
Input: A market with n agents and m items, a valuation function for each
agent, and an optimal allocation S∗.
Task: Find a pricing vector p such that (S∗, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium,
or decide that there is no Walrasian equilibrium for the instance.
This decomposition highlights that a WE exists if and only if there exists
a pricing vector p that satisfies the conditions of Definition 3 for any optimal
allocation S∗ = (S∗0 , S
∗
1 , . . . , S
∗
n). In addition, one of the results of Roughgarden
and Talgam-Cohen [30] states that if for some class V of valuation functions
WinnerDetermination is computationally harder than finding the demand
for each agent, then there exist instances in V with no WE.
For k-demand valuation functions, the conditions of Definiton 3 correspond
to the solution of the following linear system ofm variables and n ·
∑k
j=1
(
m
j
)
+m
equality/inequality constraints, where each constraint has at most 2k variables.
vi(S
∗
i )− p(S
∗
i ) ≥ vi(X)− p(X), ∀X ⊆M where |X | ≤ k, ∀i ∈ N (1)
pj ≥ 0, ∀j /∈ S
∗
0
pj = 0, ∀j ∈ S
∗
0 .
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Note that when k is a constant, as mentioned earlier, the above constraints
are n ·
∑k
j=1
(
m
j
)
+m which is at most linear in n and polynomial in m, since
k∑
j=1
(
m
j
)
≤
k∑
j=1
mj
j!
≤
k∑
j=1
kj
j!
·
(m
k
)j
≤ ek ·
k∑
j=1
(m
k
)j
≤ ek ·
(m
k
)k
.
A solution to linear system (1) can be found in time polynomial in n and
m by formulating it as an LP with objective function set to a constant. So,
for this case, the problem of deciding the existence of WE and the problem of
computing one (if it exists) essentially reduce to finding an optimal allocation
S∗. Throughout the paper we study cases with constant k, hence we exploit this
computational equivalence of WinnerDetermination and walrasian, and
focus on the former.
1.2 Related Work
Existense of Walrasian Equilibria. The most general class of valuation
functions for which existence of WE is guaranteed has been proved by Gul and
Stracchetti [20] and Milgrom [28] to be gross substitutes. Other valuation classes
(that can be seen as special market settings) outside gross substitutes that guar-
antee WE existence have also been discovered, including the “tree valuations”
in [7], and the valuation classes of [4,8,9]. Interestingly, the former admits also
a polynomial time algorithm.
Non-existence of WE has been shown for many valuation classes, mostly by
constructing an ad hoc market that does not identify some particular pattern
as responsible for the non-existence (e.g. [20,24,13]). Roughgarden and Talgam-
Cohen in [30] reprove some of these results and show a systematic way of proving
non-existence of WE for more general valuation and pricing classes via standard
complexity assumptions. The latter paper shows the remarkable relation between
computability of arbitrary problems and existence of equilibria in markets.
Computation of Walrasian Equilibria. On the computational side, in mar-
kets that do not guarantee existence of WE, the problem of deciding existence is
NP-hard for all the most important valuation classes. This has been established by
proving thatWinnerDetermination for budget-additive valuations is NP-hard
via the “knapsack” problem in [24] and via the strongly NP-hard problem “bin
packing” in [30]. By the fact that a WE corresponds to an optimal allocation, it is
immediate that existence of WE is at least as hard as WinnerDetermination.
Since budget-additive functions are a subset of submodular functions, it seems
that as soon as valuation functions are allowed to be outside gross substitudes
to the next bigger well-studied superset, i.e. submodular, the problem is already
NP-hard. Also, for the class of single-minded agents (which is incomparable to
the rest of the classes),WinnerDetermination is NP-hard [10]. In this work we
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further refine this apparent dichotomy by introducing a hierarchy of k-demand
valuation functions, and showing how the problem’s complexity changes accord-
ing to k.
It is worth mentioning the “tollbooth” problem on trees, defined in [21] (see
also [11]), for which, even though WE existence is not guaranteed, finding one
(if it exists) is in P.
Relaxations/Approximations. Due to [20] and [28], existence of WE is guar-
anteed only in a restrictive class of functions, namely gross substitutes. This fact
has ignited a line of works that, in essence, question the initially defined WE
as being the equilibrium that occurs in actual markets. These works consider
relaxed or approximate versions of WE. Some of the most interesting results on
such relaxations are the following:
– If only two-thirds of the agents are required to be utility maximizers then a
relaxed Walrasian equilibrium exists for single-minded agents ([10,11]).
– If the seller is allowed to package the items into indivisible bundles prior to
sale, not all items have to be sold, and additionally only half of the optimal
social welfare is required (Combinatorial Walrasian equilibrium) then such
an equilibrium exists for general valuation functions and can be found in
polynomial time ([17]).
– If agents exhibit endowment effect, meaning that the agents’ valuations for
a bundle they already possess is multiplied by a factor a, then for any a ≥ 2
there exists an a-endowed equilibrium for the class of submodular functions
([2]). For stronger notions of endowment, endowed equilibria exist even for
XOS functions, and additionally, bundling guarantees equilibria for general
functions ([16]).
1.3 Contribution
In this work we study WE under their classic definition with no relaxation or
approximation notions involved. We introduce a hierarchy of valuation functions,
parallel to the already existing one. Our valuation functions are called k-demand
and are a generalization of unit-demand with parameter k that determines at
most how many items from a bundle the agent cares about. By definition, it is
easy to see that the class of j-demand is included in (j + 1)-demand for any
j ∈ [m−1]. The purpose of considering valuation functions from the intersection
of some k-demand class and some other known class, is to refine the complexity
of the WE-related problem.
Algorithms and hardness results on the existence of WE and/or the problem
of computing one in the current literature show an interesting dependence on the
parameter k that we define here. For example, existence of WE is guaranteed
in the well studied case of unit-demand valuation functions (i.e. k = 1), and
a WE can be computed in polynomial time [15,25]. Non-existence of WE is
established in [30] by proving that even WinnerDetermination is NP-hard
and this is achieved for valuation functions according to which the players are
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only interested for at most 2 items (i.e. k = 2). Furthermore, non-existence of
WE and NP-hardness of WinnerDetermination is proven for single-minded
agents via a reduction to instances where agents are interested in at most 3 items
(i.e. k = 3) [10]. For each of the above cases of k we push the state of the art
forward: we supplement the “easy” case k = 1 with a novel quasi-NC algorithm6,
and the “hard” cases with stronger NP-hardness results in the sense that ours
imply the existing ones. We also go beyond these cases and study the case of
constant k and m≫ k · n or n≫ mk .
Mixing the standard valuations’ hierarchy and the k-demand hierarchy re-
sults to a two-dimensional landscape of valuation classes that aims to break
down the complexity of the WE-related problems. For example, a possible result
could be that below some threshold of k and below some standard valuation
class, deciding WE existence is in P. Our results however indicate that this is
not the case: even for k = 2 and submodular functionsWinnerDetermination
is NP-hard, and therefore deciding existence of WE is also NP-hard. This is an
improvement over the result of Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [30], where NP-
hardness is proven for k = 2 but general functions. Our reduction is entirely dif-
ferent than the one in [30], and in particular, it is from the problem “3-bounded
3-dimensional matching” to a market with n agents,m items and 2-demand sub-
modular valuations. Furthermore, in [24] WinnerDetermination is proven to
be weakly NP-hard for budget-additive functions by reducing “knapsack” to a
market with 2 agents, and m items. We show that the problem is strongly NP-
hard for k-demand budget-additive functions even for k = 3. The case k = 2 for
the latter problem remains open.
On the positive side, we show a clear dichotomy for the problem of de-
ciding WE existence with single-minded agents. It was proven in [10] that
WinnerDetermination is NP-hard, via a reduction from “exact cover by 3-
sets” to a market with single-minded agents who actually used 3-demand valu-
ations. We show that WinnerDetermination is solvable in polynomial time
for single-minded agents with 2-demand valuations by a reduction to the max-
imum weight matching problem. Then, by the decomposition shown at the end
of Section 1.1, one can find a WE pricing via an LP (if such a pricing exists).
As we showed, even for the smallest possible value for k, the problem of
deciding WE existence remains NP-hard for the next greater well-studied class of
valuations outside gross substitutes (submodular). This means that in order to
get efficient algorithms we have to further restrict our market design to markets
that retain constant demand k, but with either reduced number of agents, or
reduced number of items. In our last set of results we present polynomial-time
algorithms for k-demand general valuations for constant k in unbalanced markets.
These markets have either significantly more agents than items or vice versa.
A very important remark is that we are interested in constant k so that
our problems have succinct representation, namely polynomial in the number
of agents and items, i.e. Θ
(
n ·
(
m
k
)
· log V
)
, where V is the maximum valuation
among all bundles and among all agents. This makes our setting computationally
6 This is the first parallel algorithm for computing WE to the authors’ knowledge.
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interesting and also removes the need for access to some value oracle or demand
oracle: the former takes as input a bundle and returns its value, and the latter, for
some indicated agent, takes a pricing as input and outputs the most preferable
bundles for the agent. Having such oracles when k is constant is redundant
since one can compute in polynomial time the value for every bundle and even
though the number of bundles is 2m, they can only take
(
m
k
)
many values. Also,
a demand oracle is not needed since one can search in polynomial time through
the list of
(
m
k
)
sets of bundles (arranged according to the payoff they induce to
the given agent) and recover the most preferable bundles. In contrast, a great
line of works has studied the complexity of the WE-related problems, provided
that value oracles and demand oracles are available (e.g. [6,29,20,32,26]).
Other works have also considered special classes of valuations that have as
parameter the cardinality of the valuable bundles ([13] and [12]). However these
valuation functions are not identical to ours. In [13] the valuation function of each
agent, called k-wise dependent, is encoded in a hypergraph whose vertices are
the items and each hyperedge has a positive or negative weight that determines
the additional value of the bundle in case all of its adjacent vertices are a subset
of the bundle. This class of valuations is incomparable to ours by definition. The
model of [12] is the same as that of [13], as argued in the latter. Recently, Berger
et al. in [5] introduced a hierarchy of valuation functions similar to ours, called
“k-demand” that also generalize unit-demand functions. The same definition of
functions appears also in [14]. However, those are a special case of our k-demand
functions (i.e. also additive), and in fact they are gross substitutes.
The paper is organized in sections so that each deals with a particular value
or group of values for k. We study unit-demand valuations in Section 2, 2-
demand valuations in Section 3, 3-demand valuations in Section 4, and k-demand
valuations for constant k and unbalanced markets in Section 5. We conclude with
a discussion in Section 6.
2 Unit-demand Valuation Functions
The simplest case of markets is when the agents have unit-demand valuation
functions. The existence of WE in this class of markets was shown in the seminal
paper of Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor [15] via an algorithm that resembles
the taˆtonnement process of Walras [34]. This algorithm is pseudopolynomial in
general, and polynomial when the values of the agents are bounded by some
polynomial. In [25] an algorithm (Algorithm 1) is presented and it is shown that
a modification of it finds a WE in time O(m2n + m4 logV ), where V is the
maximum valuation of some item between all agents.
In this section we show that walrasian in these markets is in quasi-NC.
The complexity class quasi-NC is defined as quasi-NC =
⋃
k≥0 quasi-NC
k, where
quasi-NCk is the class of problems having uniform circuits of quasi-polynomial
size, nlog
O(1) n, and polylogarithmic depth O(logk n) [3]. Here “uniform” means
that the circuit can be generated in polylogarithmic space. Put differently, quasi-
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NC contains problems that can be solved in polylogarithmic parallel time using
quasi-polynomially many processors with shared memory.
In this class of markets WinnerDetermination can be reduced to a max-
imum weight matching on a complete bipartite graph. On the left side of the
graph there exist n nodes corresponding to the agents, on the left side there
are m nodes corresponding to the items and the weight of the edge (i, j) equals
to the value of agent i for item j. The recent breakthrough of Fenner, Gurjar,
and Thierauf [18] states that the maximum weight perfect matching in bipartite
graphs is in quasi-NC when the edge-weights are bounded by some polynomial;
later Svensson and Tarnawski [31] extended this result for general graphs. Thus,
if we augment the bipartite graph that corresponds to the market by adding
dummy items with zero value for every agent, or dummy agents with zero value
for every item, we can guarantee that it contains a perfect matching without
changing any optimal allocation. Then, we can use the algorithm of [18] and
compute an optimal allocation in polylogarithmic time.
Given an optimal allocation,WalrasianPricing for this markets has a spe-
cial structure. It is a linear feasibility problem with polynomially many inequal-
ities and at most two variables per inequality. For this special type of feasibility
systems there exists a quasi-NC algorithm [27].
Theorem 1. walrasian in unit-demand markets with polynomial valuations
is in quasi-NC.
Proof. When shared memory is available, as in quasi-NC, we can solve
WinnerDetermination in polylogarithmic parallel time via the algorithm of
[18] and store it in the shared memory. Then, the processors will read the so-
lution, build the linear system for WalrasianPricing and solve it in polylog-
arithmic time via the the algorithm of [27] on the shared memory. Hence, the
composition of the two algorithms can be done in polylogarithmic time using
quasi-polynomially many processors. ⊓⊔
We observe that this is the current best possible result, since any improve-
ment would imply better parallel algorithms for other important problems like
maximum weight matching and feasibility of systems with linear inequalities. We
have to state though that it is open whether both aforementioned problems are in
NC. On the other hand, it is known that the maximum weight problem in graphs
with polynomial weights is in pseudo-deterministic RNC [1,19]. Hence, a first im-
provement would be to place WalrasianPricing in pseudo-deterministic RNC.
3 2-demand Valuation Functions
In this section we resolve the complexity of deciding existence of WE for 2-
demand valuation functions. A version of 2-demand valuations, termed pair-
demand valuations, was studied in [30], where every agent i has a value vi(j, k) for
every pair of items and the value of i for a bundle S is vi(S) = maxj,k∈S vi(j, k).
These are general valuation functions that can allow complementarities. We
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strengthen the results of [30] and prove that WinnerDetermination is NP-
hard even when the valuation functions of the agents are 2-demand submodular
and every agent has positive value for at most six items.
Theorem 2. WinnerDetermination is strongly NP-hard even for 2-demand
submodular functions.
Proof. We reduce from 3-bounded 3-dimensional matching, termed 3dm(3). The
input of a 3dm(3) instance consists of three sets X,Y, Z, where |X | = |Y | = |Z|,
and a set S of triplets (hyperedges) (x, y, z) where x ∈ X, y ∈ Y , and z ∈ Z. In
addition, every element of X,Y, Z appears in at most three triplets and every
triplet shares at most one element with any other triplet. The task is to decide if
there is a subset of non-intersecting triplets of S of cardinality |X |. The problem
is known to be NP-complete [22].
For every element x ∈ X we create an agent and for every element in Y ∪Z
we create an item. Let Sxj denote the set of items that correspond to the jth
triplet of S that x belongs to. Recall that there exist at most three such triplets.
In addition, since any two triplets of S share at most one element, we have that
Sxj s are disjoint. Moreover, let Sx be the union of the elements from Sxj s. Then,
the valuation function of agent x for a subset of items T is defined as follows:
– vx(T ) = 2, if T contains some Sxj ;
– vx(T ) = 0, if |T ∩ Sx| = 0;
– vx(T ) = 1, if |T ∩ Sx| = 1;
– vx(T ) = 1.5, if |T ∩ Sx| = 2 and T does not contain any Sxj ;
– vx(T ) = 1.75, if |T ∩ Sx| = 3 and T does not contain any Sxj .
Observe that if |T ∩ Sx| > 3, then T will contain some Sxj , hence the definition
of the valuation function is complete. It is not hard to verify that vx is indeed a
2-demand submodular function.
We claim that there is an allocation with welfare 2|X | if and only if the
3dm(3) instance is satisfiable. Firstly, assume that indeed the 3dm(3) instance
has a solution S′, i.e., S′ contains |X | non intersecting triplets in S. Then, if
the triplet (x, y, z) belongs to S′ we allocate the items that correspond to y and
z to the agent that corresponds to x and the agent has value 2 for the bundle.
Clearly, the allocation achieves welfare 2|X |. For the other direction, assume
that there is an allocation for the items with welfare 2|X |. This means that
every agent gets utility 2 from her allocated bundle. Then, by construction, each
agent x alongside her allocated bundle corresponds to a triplet from S. Observe,
that the allocation consists of non-overlapping bundles, hence we get |X | non
intersecting triplets in S. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2 implies that walrasian is NP-hard for any class of valuation
functions that contains the class of 2-demand submodular valuations. Thus, it
is NP-hard for 2-demand XOS valuations and 2-demand subadditive valuations.
Corollary 1. walrasian is strongly NP-hard even if all the agents have 2-
demand submodular valuation functions.
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Closing the gap in single-minded valuations. In addition to the above
hardness results we study single-minded agents with 2-demand valuations and
we show that in this case walrasian is easy, contrary to the case of 3-demand
valuations where it is NP-hard [10]. To prove this, for agents that are single-
minded for bundles of size 2, we reduceWinnerDetermination to a maximum
weight matching problem over a graph G. Every item corresponds to a vertex of
G. For every pair of items that is the most preferable by an agent we create the
corresponding edge with weight the value of the agent for the items; if there are
more than one agents that want the same pair of items we keep only the weight
for the highest valuation. Clearly, any maximum weight matching corresponds
to an optimal allocation.
Next we show how to handle instances where every agent is either unit-
demand or 2-demand single-minded. Recall that a unit-demand agent might
have positive value for various items, and a 2-demand single-minded agent has
positive value only for a particular pair of items. To achieve this, we extend
the construction described above as follows. For every unit-demand agent j, we
add a new vertex j and the edges (i, j), where j is a vertex that corresponds to
an item, with weight equal to the agent’s value for item j. Again, a maximum
weight matching for the constructed graph corresponds to an optimal allocation.
Theorem 3. walrasian is in P for markets where every agent is unit-demand
or 2-demand single-minded.
4 3-demand Valuation Functions
In this section we prove strong NP-hardness for WinnerDetermination for
3-demand budget-additive valuation functions.
Theorem 4. WinnerDetermination is strongly NP-hard even when all the
agents have identical 3-demand budget-additive valuation functions.
Proof. We prove the theorem with a reduction from 3-partition. An instance of
3-partition consists of a multiset of 3n positive integers a1, a2, . . . , a3n summing
up to S. The question is whether the multiset can be partitioned into n triplets
such that the elements of each triplet sum up to B = Sn . So, given an instance of
3-partition we create a WinnerDetermination instance with n agents and 3n
items. All the agents have the same 3-demand budget-additive valuation: they
have value ai for item i and budget B.
The question we would like to decide is whether there exists an allocation with
social welfare n ·B. It is not hard to see that if there is a solution to 3-partition,
then there exists an allocation for WinnerDetermination with social welfare
n · B. On the other hand, observe that, due to the budget-additive valuations,
social welfare n · B for the instance can be achieved only when there exists an
allocation where every agent gets value B. In addition, since the agents have
3-demand valuation functions it means that any allocation that maximizes the
social welfare, without loss of generality, allocates exactly three items to every
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agent; otherwise some agent gets more than 3 items and value gets wasted since,
by definition of 3-demand valuation, the agent will only appreciate the 3 most
valuable of the items. Hence, if there exists an allocation for the constructed
instance with social welfare n · B, necessarily, every agent gets exactly 3 items
whose values sum up to B. This allocation trivially defines a solution to 3-
partition. ⊓⊔
Corollary 2. walrasian is strongly NP-hard even if all the agents have iden-
tical 3-demand budget-additive valuation functions.
5 Constant-demand Valuation Functions
In this section we study markets where the agents have k-demand valuation
functions, where k is constant. Our results from the previous sections imply that
deciding the existence of a WE is NP-hard even when k = 2 and the valuation
functions are submodular. In addition, we showed that the problem is NP-hard
for k = 3 even for budget-additive valuations. This means that in order to get
efficient algorithms we have to further restrict our market design in markets that
retain constant demand k, but with either reduced number of agents, or reduced
number of items. For this reason, we study unbalanced markets.
A market is unbalanced if the number of available items is significantly larger
than the number of the most valuable items to be allocated (m≫ k · n), or the
other way around (n≫ mk ).
Theorem 5. In markets with k-demand valuations, n agents and m items,
where k, n are constant, WinnerDetermination is in P.
Proof. We consider the unbalanced market where the number of available items
m is a lot greater than the number of items k · n to be allocated. The number
k · n comes from the fact that in an optimum allocation, not more than k · n
items will be appreciated by the agents (by definition of the k-demand valuation
function). Therefore allocating more than these items does not improve the sum
of valuations. In this case, we can find all possible subsets of size k · n of items,
that is, all candidate sets of items to be allocated to the agents. Formally, we
consider the set I := {L ⊆M | |L| = k · n} that consists of all (k · n)-subsets of
M . It is |I| =
(
m
k·n
)
∈ O((m− k · n)k·n), which is a polynomial in m when k and
n are constant.
Observe now that, given a subset L of items with size k ·n, one can construct
a k + 1-uniform hypergraph, i.e. a hypergraph all of whose hyperedges have
size k + 1, in the following way. Have its vertex set be L ∪ N , and for every
k-subset Lk of L have a hyperedge Lk ∪ {i} for every i ∈ N . Also, assign to
each hyperedge a weight equal to the valuation of player i for the item bundle
Lk, namely vi(Lk). On this graph one can run a brute-force algorithm to find a
maximum weight (k+1)-dimensional matching in constant time, since the graph
is of constant size. Then, by repeating the same routine for all (k · n)-subsets
of I in time polynomial in m
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weights in the matching. The optimal allocation of items to agents corresponds
to the aforementioned optimum matching. The running time of this algorithm
is O(mc) for some constant c, i.e. polynomial in the input size, since the input
size is Ω
(
n ·
(
m
k
)
· logV
)
bits, where V := max i∈N
X⊆M
vi(X); that is because every
agent has to declare how much is her valuation for every k-subset of items. ⊓⊔
Corollary 3. In markets with k-demand valuations, n agents and m items,
where k, n are constant, walrasian is in P.
Theorem 6. In markets with k-demand valuations, n agents and m items,
where k is constant and m ∈ O
(
log n
log logn
)
, WinnerDetermination is in P.
Proof. We consider the unbalanced market where the number of available items
m is a lot smaller than the number of items k · n to be allocated. Here, we
consider again k to be constant so that the LP based algorithm under Definition
3 for computing WE prices runs in polynomial time. Without loss of generality,
we will assume that m/k is an integer, since we can always add up to k − 1
“dummy” items whose value is 0 for every agent and do not affect the valuation
when inserted in some bundle. Now we will enumerate all possible partitions
P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pm/k) ofM intom/k many k-subsets. In particular, we consider
the set J := {P | |Pi| = k, ∀i ∈ [m/k]} that consists of all possible partitions
of M into k-sized parts. It is |J | =
(
m
k,k,...,k
)
= m!
(k!)m/k
≤ m!. Since for the
gamma function Γ (m + 1) := m! it holds that Γ−1(m) ∈ Θ
(
logm
log logm
)
, when
m ∈ O
(
logn
log logn
)
it is |J | ∈ O (nc) for some constant c.
Now, starting from some partition P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pm/k), we can construct
a bipartite graph in the following way. Consider as one part of vertices A :=
{P1, P2, . . . , Pm/k}, the other part of vertices B := N , and have each vertex
of A connect to every vertex of B. Also, assign on each edge that connects Pj
with i ∈ N , the valuation of agent i for the item bundle Pj , namely vi(Pj). One
can find a maximum weight matching on this complete bipartite graph in time
polynomial in n. By repeating this routine for all possible partitions inside J
in time polynomial in n, we pick the partition that yields the maximum sum of
weights in the matching. The optimal allocation of items to agents corresponds
again to the aforementioned optimum matching. The described algorithm runs
in time O(nd) for some constant d, and it is polynomial in the input size, which
is Ω
(
n ·
(
m
k
)
· log V
)
bits as explained in the proof of Theorem 5. ⊓⊔
Corollary 4. In markets with k-demand valuations, n agents and m items,
where k is constant and m ∈ O
(
log n
log logn
)
, walrasian is in P.
6 Discussion
In this paper we study the complexity of computing Walrasian equilibria in mar-
kets with k-demand valuations. For markets with k = 1, known as “matching
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markets”, we prove that the problem is in quasi-NC. We view this as a very
interesting result since all the known algorithms for the problem are highly
sequential. Can we design an NC algorithm for the problem via a form of a simul-
taneous auction? This would be remarkable since it would imply that bipartite
weighted matching is in NC. For k = 2 we show that WinnerDetermination
is intractable even for submodular functions, and for k = 3 the hardness re-
mains for an even stricter class, namely budget-additive functions. In order to
completely resolve the complexity of 2-demand valuations, it remains to solve
WinnerDetermination for 2-demand budget-additive valuations. Is the prob-
lem NP-hard, or is there a polynomial time algorithm for it? Answering this
question would provide a complete dichotomy for the complexity of the prob-
lems WinnerDetermination and also Walrasian. Another very intriguing
direction is to study approximate Walrasian equilibria. The recent results of
Babaioff, Dobzinski, and Oren [2] and of Ezra, Feldman, and Friedler [16] pro-
pose some excellent notions of approximation. Can we get better results if we
assume k-demand valuations?
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